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Abstract 
The importance of social trust has become widely accepted in the social 
sciences. A number of explanations have been put forward for the stark variation in social 
trust among countries. Among these, participation in voluntary associations received most 
attention.  Yet, there is scant evidence that participation can lead to trust. In this paper, we 
shall examine a variable that has not gotten the attention we think it deserves in the discussion 
about the sources of generalized trust, namely equality.  We conceptualize equality in two 
dimensions: One is economic equality and the other is equality of opportunity. The omission 
of both these dimensions of equality in the social capital literature is peculiar for several 
reasons. One is that it is obvious that the countries that score highest on social trust also rank 
highest on economic equality, namely the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and Canada. 
Secondly, these are countries have put a lot of effort in creating equality of opportunity, not 
least in regard to their policies for public education, health care, labor market opportunities 
and (more recently) gender equality. The argument for increasing social trust by reducing 
inequality has largely been ignored in the policy debates about social trust.  Social capital 
research has to a large extent been used by several governments and policy organizations to 
send a message to people that the bad things in their society is caused by too little 
volunteering. The policy implications that follows from our research is that the low levels of 
trust and social capital that plague many countries are caused by too little government action 
to reduce inequality. However, many countries with low levels of social trust and social 
capital may be stuck in what is known as a social trap.  The logic of such a situation is the 
following. Social trust will not increase because massive social inequality prevails, but the 
public policies that could remedy this situation can not be established precisely because there 
is a genuine lack of trust. This lack of trust concerns both “other people” and the government 
institutions that are needed to implement universal policies. 
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All for All: Equality and Social Trust: Introduction 
 
The importance of social trust has become widely accepted in the social 
sciences.  One reason for the interest in social trust is that, as measured in surveys, it 
correlates with a number of other variables that are normatively highly desirable. At the 
individual level, people who believe that most other people in their society in general can be 
trusted, are also more inclined to have a positive view of their democratic institutions, to 
participate more in politics and to be more active in civic organizations. They also give more 
to charity and they are more tolerant towards minorities and to people who are not like 
themselves. Trusting people also have a more optimistic view of their possibilities to have an 
influence over their own life-chances and, not least important, to be more happy with how 
their life is going.1  
   We see the same positive pattern at the societal level.  Cities, regions and 
countries with more trusting people are likely to have better working democratic institutions, 
to have more open economies, greater economic growth, and less crime and corruption.2 Both 
at the individual and societal levels, many things that are normatively desirable seem 
connected to social trust. The issue of causality is admittedly a different question from the 
statistical correlations, but so many correlations point in the same direction that social 
scientists from many different disciplines have begun to pay a lot of attention to trust.3   
Trust varies widely across nations.  In Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, 
around 60 percent of people believe most other people can be trusted, while in Brazil, the 
Philippines and Turkey, around 10 percent trust others.4   Delhey and Newton argue that when 
people answer if they think that most other people can be trusted, this can be interpreted as 
their evaluation of the moral standard of the society in which they live.5  This implies that 
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trust reflects a sense of social solidarity, the belief that the various groups in society have a 
shared fate and that there is a responsibility to provide possibilities for those with less 
resources. We see this connection between social trust and solidarity in the good deeds that 
trusters perform (giving to charity, volunteering their time) and in the policies that trusting 
societies pursue in helping those with fewer resources.6 
  We argue that social trust is caused by two different, yet interrelated types of 
equality, namely economic equality and equality of opportunity.7  This argument has 
important implications for public policy because universal social policies are more effective 
than selective ones in creating both types of equality and thereby social trust.8 However, we 
have a somewhat pessimistic conclusion on the political possibilities to establish universal 
equality enhancing social policies in developing and post-socialist countries. Since social trust 
is a measure of how people evaluate the moral fabric in their society, there is little reason to 
believe that countries with low social trust will establish universal social programs precisely 
because such programs must be based on a general political understanding that the various 
groups in society have a shared fate. Countries with an initial level of high inequality and with 
dishonest government are less likely to establish universal social programs. Such programs 
increase social trust in three ways. First, they are more redistributive than means-tested 
programs and thus create more economic equality. Second, since they are based on the 
principle of equal treatment and minimize bureaucratic discretion, they increase the sense of 
“equality of opportunity” within the population.9    Third, means-tested programs exacerbate 
class and often racial divisions within a society—and thus lead to less generalized trust and 
more in-group trust, while universalistic programs enhance social solidarity and the 
perception of a shared fate among citizens. 
The reason why countries with high (or rising) levels of inequality are less likely 
to establish universal programs is that such programs are usually based on the idea that all 
 5 
groups in society, regardless of their social and economic status, have a shared fate.  They will 
place trust only in their own group or class—and those with fewer resources will believe that 
they do not have the same opportunities as people with greater resources. The rich got that 
way, people will reason, by unfair advantages.  People with less will thus demand radical 
redistribution from the rich to the poor and will seek to exclude those with greater resources 
from receiving benefits from the state or society.   Ironically, when you need to prove you are 
poor to get government benefits, you create resentment and distrust rather than empowerment 
and trust—and these very “means-tested’ policies fail to alleviate inequality and to increase 
further trust in fellow citizens.  Policies designed to reduce poverty instead create a trap of 
high inequality, less optimism for the future, less trust in others, greater in-group 
identification, and persistent inequities in the distribution of wealth. 
One could argue that advocates for low-income groups in societies with high 
inequality would opt for universal social programs because they would realize that such 
programs would be most beneficial for their groups. Historically, this has seldom been the 
case.10 The first reason is probably that the logic why universal programs are more 
redistributive than programs directed specifically to “the poor” is complex and difficult to 
understand. Many well-known political philosophers who have ventured into the discussion 
about social justice have failed to grasp this logic.11 The redistributive effects of universal 
social programs are difficult to explain and therefore it is hard to get support for such 
programs from underprivileged groups. Secondly, universal programs also benefit the more 
well-to-do groups and in a society with an initially high inequality, advocates for 
underprivileged groups will have an uphill battle convincing their followers that scarce public 
resources should also go to middle-class people.  
We argue that the roots of generalized trust lie in a more equitable distribution 
of resources and opportunities in a society.  Countries with histories of greater equality such 
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as the Nordic nations also had histories of less repressive and more honest governments.  
Greater equality and less corruption leads to more inclusive (universalistic) social welfare 
programs and to greater generalized trust. We will also argue that inequality stands at the 
beginning of the causal chain.  We see the distribution of resources and opportunities in a 
society as the key to the other parts of our story—honest government, generalized trust, and 
social welfare regimes.    
 Equality and honesty in government stand at the beginning of our causal chain.  
Both are necessary to create trust and the universalistic social policies that lead to a greater 
level of equality and social cohesion.   The reinforcing effects of inequality and honesty on 
trust and social policy—and the “feedback” to greater trust and less inequality—leads to a 
positive equilibrium for societies that initially took the steps to adopt universalistic social 
welfare policies.  But they lead to a negative equilibrium—an inequality trap—for countries 
with high or increasing inequality and corrupt governments.  While equality and honest 
government come first, the reciprocal effects we posit make it difficult (at best) for countries 
to escape the inequality trap. 
We shall support our claims by a variety of methods.  First, we show by a cross-
national statistical analysis that inequality is a key factor in shaping generalized trust, but that 
there is no direct effect of trust on inequality (the causal direction starts with inequality).   
Second, we also examine the connections among honesty in government, trust, and policy 
decisions by summarizing the state of research on corruption rather than presenting new 
empirical analyses.  Third, we examine how the history of relatively greater equality and 
honesty in government laid the foundation for universalistic social welfare policies in 
Sweden—and how these policies have helped to reinforce a sense of social solidarity   Forth, 
we show how means-tested benefits lead to less trust in a society that has been averse to 
universalistic policies—the United States.   Finally, we support our argument (from a wide 
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range of findings) of why initially egalitarian societies are likely to remain so—and why it is 
so difficult for unequal societies to develop generalized trust, honest government, 
universalistic social policies—and greater equality.  
 
Trust versus Trust: The Theory 
          Generalized trust links us to people who are different from ourselves. It stands in 
contrast to particularized trust, where people only have faith in their in-group.  Generalized 
trust reflects a bond that people share across a society, across economic and ethnic groups, 
religions, and races.   Particularized trust reflects social strains, where each group in a society 
looks out for their own interests and places little faith in the good intentions of others. 
Particularized trusters may be as involved in civic life as generalized trusters, but they will 
restrict their activities and good deeds to their own kinds.   
Generalized trust both depends upon a foundation of economic and social 
equality and contributes to the development of a more egalitarian society.  As social trust 
links us to people who are different from ourselves, it reflects a concern for others, especially 
people who have faced discrimination and who thereby have fewer resources.12  In societies 
with high levels of economic inequality and with few (or inefficient) policies in place for 
increasing equality of opportunity, there is less concern for people of different backgrounds.  
The rich and the poor in a country with a highly unequal distribution of wealth such as Brazil 
may live next to each other, but their lives do not intersect. Their children attend different 
schools, they use different health care services. and in many cases, the poor can’t afford 
neither of these services. The rich are protected by both the police and private guards, while 
the poor see these as their natural enemies. In such societies, neither the rich nor the poor have 
a sense of shared fate with the other. Generalized trust is low while particularized (or in-
group) trust will be high.  In turn, each group looks out for its own interests and is likely to 
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see the demands of the other as conflicting with their own well-being. Society is seen as a 
zero-sum game between conflicting groups.   
Government policies have a large impact on economic equality.13 Universal 
social programs that cater to the whole (or very broad sections) of society, such as we find in 
the Scandinavian countries, promote a more equitable distribution of wealth and more 
equality of opportunity in areas such as education and the labor market.14 Both types of 
equality lead to a greater sense of social solidarity--which spurs generalized trust.  
Generalized trust, in turn, provides at least part of the foundation for policies (such as 
universal benefits) that lead to more equality. This is not an argument that there is a mono-
directional relation between independent variables (policies) and dependent variables (norms), 
since we admit that there are “feedback mechanisms” and “increasing returns” between these 
variables.15 Instead, we want to capture the logic of how the causal mechanisms work over 
time between these variables, or what have made the vicious and virtuous cycles start cycling 
in the way they do. 
 
Why Some Countries are More Trusting than Others 
 Why do some countries have more trusting citizens than others?  The most widely 
cited explanation focuses on participation in voluntary associations. This explanation has not 
stood up well against empirical tests.  For example, one recent large scale empirical study 
covering 60 countries concludes that “perhaps most important and most surprising, none of 
the four measures of voluntary activity stood up to statistical rests, in spite of the importance 
attached to them in a large body of writing, from de Tocqueville onwards".16  
 Our alternative account holds that the key factor underlying trust is the level of 
equality in a society.  We conceptualize equality in two dimensions: One is economic equality 
and the other is equality of opportunity.  Equality of results is relatively simple to understand, 
if not to measure: How equitably are resources distributed within a society? There are many 
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different measures of inequality in the literature; we use the most commonly employed 
measure, the Gini index of inequality, because it is available for the largest number of 
countries. 
 Equality of opportunity is the second dimension of equality we consider critical.  
Equality of opportunity focuses on the chance that people see for economic progress in the 
future—even if society is highly stratified now.  Even in cases when governments cannot 
immediately reduce inequality, they can enact policies that offer greater opportunities for 
economic equality. For example, spending on universal programs for education promises 
long-term opportunities for greater equality of results as higher education opens up 
opportunities for economic advancement.  Education is also one of the strongest determinants 
of generalized trust.17   
  A perception of shared fate depends heavily upon both types of equality.  
Seligman argues that trust can not take root in a hierarchal culture.18  Such societies have rigid 
social orders marked by strong class divisions that persist across generations.  Feudal systems 
and societies based on castes dictate what people can and can not do based upon the 
circumstances of their birth.  When economic resources are stratified—or when people 
believe that others have unfair advantages, trust will not develop and the benefits of trust, 
including policies that reduce further inequalities, will be elusive. The assumption that others 
share your beliefs is counterintuitive, since strict class divisions make it unlikely that others 
actually have the same values as people in other classes.   
  The omission of both these dimensions of equality in the social capital literature is 
peculiar for several reasons. One is that the countries that score highest on social trust also 
rank highest on economic equality-- the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and Canada.  Trust 
and inequality are strongly related across countries without a legacy of Communist rule.19   In 
Figure 1 we show the connection between trust aggregated to the country level and the 
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Deininger-Squire measure of economic inequality for 43 countries in the 1990s.  The 
relationship is reasonably strong at r2 = .391 for 43 cases.  Using the newer Galbraith 
measures of inequality, the N drops to 32 but the r2 rises to .582.20   These results are thus not 
confined to one particular data set.  Over time, the relationship between trust and economic 
inequality (from 1960 to 2002) in the United States is also powerful: r2 = .592 (N = 32).  The 
effects of economic inequality on trust are long-lasting (not surprising since neither changes 
readily).  The effect of the 1963 index of inequality on trust across countries is just as 
powerful—and perhaps a bit more so—as the 1996 level of economic stratification.21 
 We elaborate on these findings in Table 1, where we reproduce part of a six-
equation model that Uslaner estimates in a study of corruption.22  Showing just the equations 
for trust and inequality tell the same story as a simpler two equation model (with far fewer 
cases) in Uslaner: Inequality is a strong predictor of generalized trust, but there is no direct 
effect of trust on inequality.23  The direction goes from inequality to trust but not the other 
way around.   These results are not confined to a single set of models.  Inequality is the 
strongest determinant of generalized trust over time in the United States and across the 
American states.24   
Figure 1, Table 1 about here 
 As we move from the low level of inequality in Belgium to the very high level in 
South Africa, trust declines by 23 percent.  This is equivalent to moving from the low trust 
level of Serbia, the Czech Republic, South Korea, Spain, or Bulgaria to the high levels of the 
Netherlands and Canada.  To be sure, other factors shape trust as well: Protestant societies 
have higher levels of trust, while former Communist nations and countries that have had civil 
wars have lower levels of trust.    
 The model in Table 1 is part of a six equation model estimated by Uslaner25 that 
includes not only trust and inequality, but also corruption (the Transparency International 
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Corruption Perceptions Index for 2004), whether a country has strangling regulations (from 
the World Bank’s governance indicators), the stability of a country’s economy (as measured 
by the overall risk measure from the International Country Risk Guide), and an index of 
government effectivess (derived from a factor analysis of six indicators at the country level 
from the 2004 World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey).  The model was 
estimated by two-stage least squares. 
 The model in Table 1 also shows that countries that have experienced civil wars 
are less trusting, as are former Communist nations.  Communism made it difficult to trust 
anyone outside your own family (and sometimes even within your own family).  Protestant 
societies, which have more individualistic political cultures, are also more trusting.  The 
collectivist and hierarchical cultures of Catholic societies lead to less generalized trust (and 
more in-group trust).   Effective governments do not lead to more trust among citizens.26  
Corruption leads to greater inequality (the Transparency International measure gives higher 
scores to countries with less corruption), while former Communist nations and countries with 
large Muslim populations have less inequality.  The lack of markets in former Communist 
nations levelled incomes; Islam has stressed equality.  We expected that wealthy Protestant 
nations might also have less inequality, but they do not—and the coefficient suggests that 
they might even be less equal. 
 You also finds support for a link from inequality to trust in individual level data as 
well.27  He estimates hierarchial linear models for generalized trust in 80 countries using the 
1995-97 and 1999-2001 waves of the World Values Surveys.   His models indicate that trust 
is lower in countries with higher levels of inequality.  In a creative use of aggregate indices of 
income distribution, he shows that the skewness (fairness) of the distribution of income 
significantly lowers trust, while the dispersion of the distribution (which he calls 
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“similarlity”) does not significantly shape trust.  How much you earn is not critical for trust—
but when the income distribution is highly unequal, social solidarity declines.   
 The Nordic countries have put a lot of effort in creating equality of opportunity, 
not least in regard to their policies for public education, labor market opportunities and (more 
recently) gender equality. One can certainly debate whether or not these policies have been as 
successful as was hoped for, but comparatively these governments have been ambitious in 
launching policies and programs in these areas.28 Our argument is that by establishing 
universal social programs, governments send signals to the citizens that are important for the 
creation of citizen solidarity and social trust.  
There are good theoretical reasons why both types of equality and social trust 
should be causally related.  First, optimism for the future (which is one key determinant of 
social trust) makes less sense when there is more economic inequality.   When people believe 
that the future looks bright, trusting strangers seems less risky.29 The less fortunate have less 
reason to be optimistic about their (or their children’s) future if they sense that society is not 
giving them equality of opportunity, especially in areas such as education and the labor 
market.  People at the bottom of the income distribution, or minorities that feel discriminated, 
will be less sanguine that they too share in society’s bounty.  How well the country is doing 
collectively, rather than how well any of us is doing individually, leads to changes in 
generalized trust.30   
  Second, the distribution of resources and opportunities plays a key role in 
establishing the belief that people share a common destiny and have similar fundamental 
values.  When resources and opportunities are distributed more equally, people are more 
likely to perceive a common stake with others and to see themselves as part of a larger social 
order.  If there is a strong skew in wealth or in the possibilities to improve once stake in life, 
people at each end may feel that they have little in common with others. In highly unequal 
 13 
societies, people are likely to stick with their own kind.  Perceptions of injustice will reinforce 
negative stereotypes of other groups, making social trust and accommodation more difficult.31  
The omission of equality from the literature on social capital and social trust is 
something of a mystery. While Putnam points at the importance of economic inequality in his 
analysis of the decline of social capital in the United States, it is not mentioned in his 
conclusion about “what killed civic engagement?”32 Among the seven policy prescriptions for 
increasing social capital in the U.S. that he presents, none touches upon increasing any form 
of equality.33 This is all the more surprising since the decline of social capital that Putnam 
finds in the United States since the 1970s seems to be suspiciously related in time to a 
dramatic increase in economic inequality.34  Inequality has increased in the United States as 
its welfare state has contracted since the 1980s.35  
The same strange omission can be seen in the Russell Sage Foundation’s large 
project on trust: Among the 41 chapters in the three edited volumes, none is about economic 
inequality and none of the volumes has an index entry on equality or inequality.36 The same 
goes for the three monographs that this project has produced.37 While political scientists and 
sociologists largely have neglected the importance of equality for creating social trust, 
economists have been more interested.  Stephen  Knack and  Paul Zak at the World Bank 
have concluded that redistribution is one important policy options for governments to increase 
social trust (but in a way that seems mandatory for economists, they add that they worry about 
the economic inefficiencies that they believe can be caused by such redistribution).38  Social 
capital research has to a large extent been used by several governments and policy 
organizations to send a message to people that the bad things in their society is caused by too 
little volunteering.39  40   What if the low levels of trust and social capital are caused by too 
little government action to reduce inequality? 
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On the Need for Honest Government 
 While our argument puts inequality at the beginning of the causal chain, we also 
believe that honest government is essential for the enactment of universalistic social welfare 
programs.  There may not be a direct tie between effective government and  trust, but 
dishonest government undermines trust at least indirectly41 —and it makes universalistic 
welfare policies difficult to enact.    
 Honest government is important for the enactment of universal social welfare 
programs for three reasons.  First, corruption is based upon loyalty to the in-group and not to 
the larger society,42 so universal social welfare policies are anathema to dishonest 
government.  Corrupt societies reflect patron-client relationships and corrupt leaders reward 
only those who show their loyalty rather than the entire society,    
 Second, universalistic policies require higher levels of taxation than means-
tested programs and dishonest governments will have fewer resources to spend on public 
programs.  Corruption transfers resources from the mass public to the elites–and generally 
from the poor to the rich.43  It acts as an extra tax on citizens, leaving less money for public 
expenditures.44  Corrupt governments have less money to spend on their own projects, 
pushing down the salaries of public employees.  In turn, these lower-level staffers will be 
more likely to extort funds from the public purse. Government employees in corrupt societies 
will thus spend more time lining their own pockets than serving the public.  When political 
leaders extract money to line their own pockets, not only will there be fewer resources to 
spend on social programs, but the public will have less confidence in government— people 
will only pay high taxes if they believe that they get a reasonable value back in form of 
services and benefits.45    
 Third, while universalistic social welfare policies promote generalized trust, 
they are unlikely to be adopted in a society that initially ranks low on equality and trust.   
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Corruption will exacerbate inequality and mistrust and lead to social conflicts that militate 
against universalistic social welfare policies.   
 We see an indirect effect of corruption on trust in the statistical analysis in Table 
1 above.  Corruption leads to greater inequality, which in turn produces lower levels of trust.   
While the aggregate analyses in Uslaner46 show a link from low levels of trust to high levels 
of corruption, but not from corruption to trust, survey data from Romania and Estonia show 
that perceptions of high level corruption make people less likely to trust their fellow 
citizens.47  48  Moreover, recent experimental work shows that both (high trusting) Swedish 
and (low trusting) Romanian students, when confronted with scenarios where they encounter 
that public officials in an “unknown city in an unknown country” are asking for and also 
getting bribes, do not only loose trust in these public officials (policemen and doctors), but 
also in “other people in general” in that “unknown city….”.49  50  
Stoyanov et al.51 report survey data on Bulgaria showing that “the reasons for being 
wealthy...have to do mainly with the unfair social system ensuring better opportunities for the 
well connected’ and the unscrupulous....the negative image of wealthy people does not 
represent only the communist socialization stereotype, but results also from 
recent...experiences of corruption, organized crime, and `illegal” wealth.`”   While most 
Westerners believe that the path to wealth stems from hard work, 80 percent of Bulgarians, 
Hungarians, and Russians say that high incomes reflect dishonesty52 —in direct contrast to 
Westerners, who are more likely to say that success comes from individual initiatives.53   
Orkeney and Szekelyi54  present data showing that people in transition countries are far less 
likely than citizens of Western nations to believe that people have equal opportunities to 
succeed, are rewarded for their own efforts, and that people get what they need; instead, 
connections and dishonesty are the principal factors that make people wealthy. 
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When people think that the only route to prosperity is through dishonesty, this 
heightens social tensions between those at the top and the people who have less.55   This 
creates a situation in which ordinary citizens reject universal welfare programs and instead 
call for redistribution of income away from the rich.   In Romania, beliefs that corruption is 
widespread, personal experiences with corruption (enforced “gift payments” to public 
officials or the courts), and perceptions of rising inequality lead to demands to limit the 
income of the rich.56  Where there is a dearth of social solidarity due to class envy, the social 
bonds of generalized trust will be weak, and so will the propensity (especially from the 
middle class) to pay high taxes.  People will identify more with their class or ethnic group (or 
both) than with members of the larger society.  And they will not trust the government to 
distribute resources in a fair and honest way.   Rohter summarizes this dilemma in Latin 
America: 
I don't think there is any more vital issue in Latin America right 
now….It's a vicious cycle that is very hard to break. People don't want to 
pay taxes because they say government doesn't deliver services, but 
government institutions aren't going to perform any better until they have 
resources, which they obtain when people pay their taxes.57 
 In low-trust societies with high degrees of economic inequality, universal 
programs are likely to fail for lack of  political support.   Even such policies were adopted, 
there is a strong possibility that they will fail in the implementation process.  Education, 
health care, and social insurance benefits (as well as the police and the courts) may very well 
become commodities for sale because corruption is pervasive.  Parents “buy” their children’s 
way into good schools, especially universities, and then pay even more for good grades.  
Extra “gift payments” to doctors are routine in countries with high levels of economic 
inequality.   Police will stop drivers for invented traffic infractions and pedestrians for 
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attempting to cross in the middle of traffic and demand payments in lieu of tickets.  Each of 
these actions subvert trust in government and thereby the notion that they could implement 
universal social policies in a fair and equal way. Instead, suspicion that bureaucrats will give 
extra advantage to those willing and able to make the “extra” payment is likely to be 
pervasive.58  
 In countries with high levels of corruption, the public is hostile to people who 
have more.  Where corruption is high, voters are likely to believe that the poor are treated 
unfairly by society in general and by government institutions in particular. Low income 
groups are therefore likely to opt for left-wing parties that present a case for more “radical” 
redistribution of resources than would occur under universal social welfare programs.59  In 
such a situation, it is easy for “radical” political entrepreneurs to argue that dispensing justice 
to those who prosper illegitimately, (for example due to various forms of corruption) means 
taking resources away from the poor and needy.  Thus, inequality and corruption breed 
mistrust, which produces no support for the very type of social welfare programs that are most 
effective in reducing disparities of income. 
 
Institutions for equality and social trust – how did it start? 
Different countries are set into different causal cycles between their institutions 
for social policies and their level of social trust. This certainly raises the difficult question on 
how this causal logic got started. Did the Scandinavian countries develop broad based 
(universal) social policies because of an initially high level of social trust and less social 
inequality, or was it the other way around?  As we have no survey data about the level of 
social trust from the 1920s, this is difficult to answer.   However, we have quite a few 
historical studies about the character of the Scandinavian societies that existed before the 
universal type social policies where launched. 
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First, in the beginning of the modern era, the Scandinavian countries had a more 
equal social structure than the rest of Europe.60  The Swedish and Norwegian peasants had not 
been subdued under a continental style feudalism but were legally independent.  Until the 
reform of the Swedish Parliament in 1867, Swedish farmers had their own estate, a situation 
that was unique in Europe. According to Charles Tilly, “[t]win facts.... strongly affected the 
path of the Swedish state formation: first, the overwhelming presence of a peasantry that held 
plenty of land well into the eighteenth century.61 Second, the relative inability of landlords 
either to form great estates or to coerce peasant labour on their lands.”  This also holds for 
Norway, which was in a union with Sweden until 1905 and had no aristocracy. In Denmark,  
farmers had joined in an alliance with the urban bourgeoisie in the successful overthrow of 
absolutism in 1849. The political strength of the farmers gradually grew in the decades.  They 
consolidated themselves as a independent and powerful political class by joining in producer 
organizations, insurance associations, savings banks, cultural and educational services and 
many other organizations. They did so, moreover, on a much greater scale than in other 
countries. Politically, the farmers united in the late 19th century in the Liberal party (Venstre), 
which came into power in 1901.62    
Secondly, during the late 19th century, a Weberian style, rule-governed, mostly 
meritocratic and fairly uncorrupted civil service had developed in the Scandinavian 
countries.63  When the social reforms that formed the beginning of the universal principles of 
social policy were launched, there were few suspicions that the civil service that would 
manage the programs might be corrupt.  The reforms were hotly disputed, but the argument 
that the civil service was corrupt and therefore could not be trusted was never put forward--or 
at least, has never been reported in the historical studies that exists of the early stages of the 
Swedish welfare state.64  The Scandinavian countries are hardly without class conflict.  It was 
especially severe in the mid-1930s and Sweden lost many days per worker due to industrial 
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strife in the 1920s.65  Yet, the conflicts in Sweden were ultimately resolved peacefully—
clearly due to the country’s long history of  greater equality than elsewhere in Europe and 
confidence in governing authority that stemmed from a history of honest government. 
A detailed account of the historical development in the Swedish case indicates 
that it was the impartiality of the government institutions, especially those handling policies 
related to the labor market and social policy, that made the development of an “historical 
compromise” between labor and capital possible. This compromise was to a large extent built 
on “a spirit of trust”66  that developed into the well-known “Swedish Model” that came to 
mark the Swedish society after 1936.67  
There is much that points in the direction that it was the existence of impartial, 
uncorrupted, and fairly efficient government institutions that laid the foundation for the elite 
accomodation that helped to create strong norms about trust in Sweden.   Public confidence in 
the integrity of their leaders and institutions provided the key support for the compromise that 
provided the basis for universal policies that would reduce inequality and increase social 
cohesion and trust.  The Scandinavian countries were historically less unequal than the 
continental European countries. Secondly, they had less of corruption and more honest 
government institutions.   
Social policies and social trust 
       Universal welfare policies fare much better at reducing inequality than do simple 
redistribution scheme that implies selective policies.68 (This is a paradox because one would 
assume that redistributive policies that tax the rich and give to the poor would be the most 
efficient way to reduce poverty, while universal policies that give everyone the same service 
or benefits (e.g., universal child allowances or universal health care) would not have a 
redistributive effect. But the facts are exactly the opposite.69  The technical reason why 
universal systems are more efficient in reducing economic inequality is that taxes are usually 
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proportional or progressive, but services or benefits are nominal--you get a certain sum or a 
certain type of service.70  
People do not get more out of the system because they earn more. The net effect 
of proportional (or progressive) taxes and nominal services/benefits is a considerable 
redistribution from the rich to the poor. The political reasons why universal policies are more 
effective for alleviating poverty are that if a state is going to tax the rich and give to the poor, 
the rich (especially the middle class) will not agree to pay high taxes because they perceive 
that they do not get enough back.71  They will perceive such programs as policies only for 
“the poor” and especially the middle class (who are also the “swing voters”) will turn away 
from political parties that argue for increasing taxes and social policies. 72   
Additionally, the implementation of universal progams follows two important 
equality principles. First, these programs treat everyone in the same situation equally.  
Second, because they are given without means-testing, universal programs do not have to 
organize a large bureaucracy to decide eligiblity.  Selective welfare programs often stigmatize 
recipients as “welfare clients”.  They demarcate the rich and the poor and those at the bottom 
are made to feel that they are less worthy, not least because of the bureaucratic intrusion felt 
in the process of implementation.73  Universal programs are connected to citizens’ rights, 
while selective welfare programs have trouble with legitimacy because they have to single out 
the “deserving” from the “non-deserving poor”. This will always imply discretionary 
decisions by street-level bureaucrats who may intrude on the personal integrity of clients.   
People who receive selective welfare benefits often feel demeaned and apart 
from others in society.  Recipients of means-tested benefits, for example Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) in the United States, are more likely to believe that the 
government was distant and unresponsive—and that their efforts to participate in the political 
process would be futile.  In the United States, recipients of benefits that are not means-tested, 
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such as for example disability insurance under Social Security, did not differ from the broader 
population that received no government benefits.74  Soss writes of means-tested benefits in the 
United States through AFDC: 
The act of welfare claiming, especially in a public assistance program, can be 
mortifying.  The degraded identity it conveys can effectively strip individuals 
of full and equal community membership.75 
One AFDC recipient spoke of the how she felt degraded when applying for benefits: 
They’re the cowboys and you’re a cow....You go all the way through 
this line to do this, and then this time to do that.  It’s like a cattle 
prod....I felt like I was in a prison system....these people are like, 
‘I’m helping you.  This is something I’m doing for you.  So just be 
quiet and follow your line.76  
People who receive Social Security disability benefits in the U.S., the universal program, are 
not required to answer detailed questions about their personal life, do not feel threatened with 
loss of benefits, and believe that their case workers treat them with respect—and are not 
alienated from others.77   
Denigrating recipients of means-tested government programs leads to social 
strains in two ways: The poor feel isolated and feel that others deem them unworthy.  The 
denigration of welfare recipients feeds on public perceptions that the poor truly are 
responsible for their own poverty.  Neither side sees a shared fate with the other.  In contrast, 
universal programs do not cast aspersions on the responsibility of benefits and thus do not 
destroy trust.  When they work well, they can even help to create it by increasing feelings of 
equal treatment and equality of opportunity. 
 The 1992 American National Election Study (ANES) asked people if they received 
means-tested benefits such as welfare and Medicaid (targeted medical assistance to the poor).  
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People who received only these means-tested benefits—and not universal payments such as 
Social Security or Medicare (both for the aged of all incomes)--were less likely to trust other 
people than people who did not receive such benefits: 21 percent of people receiving means-
tested benefits trusted others, compared to 49 percent of Americans who received no means-
tested benefits.  We estimate a multivariate statistical (probit) model of trust based upon the 
analysis of Uslaner.78  79     
  The model includes standard predictors of trust—education (separate measures for 
high school and college), sociability with neighbours, race, age, economic status (own your 
own home), as well as the social psychological roots of trust: optimism for life 20 years in the 
future, feelings of efficacy in politics, attitudes toward your own in-group (particularized 
trust), perceptions of desirable traits for children (being curious rather than simply having 
“good manners” and being considerate as opposed to simply being “well behaved” )—and the 
belief that it would be better off to worry less about inequality.   Income was insignficant and 
we excluded it from this model.  If you are optimistic about the future and believe that you 
can make a difference in politics, if you want your children to be kind and curious more than 
simply well behaved, you will be more trusting.  If you are committed to equality and not 
overly committed to your in-group, you will also be more likely to trust others.   Even after 
we take into account all of these other factors, we find that people who receive means-tested 
benefits are nine percent less likely to be generalized trusters than people who do not receive 
such benefits (see Table 2).    
Table 2 about here 
When people do not see themselves as part of the same moral community with a 
shared fate, they will not have the solidarity that is essential for building up social trust.  
Means-testing stigmatizes the poor and makes them feel that they are “apart” from others in 
the society in critical ways and that the government is less concerned for their welfare than for 
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those with more resources.  Evidence from the U.S. shows that instead of increasing equality, 
a welfare state built mainly on means-testing program perpetuates feelings of inequality both 
among the poor and the more affluent.    
If we compare this evidence from the United States with Swedish data, the 
similarities are striking. People in Sweden who are the target of selective measures such as 
determining eligibility for social assistance and disability pensions have significantly lower 
trust in other people than the rest of the population.80  In a survey about Swedish citizens’ 
contacts with various welfare state programs, respondents were asked to state whether they 
had dealt with a number of selective welfare institutions. The minority of Swedes who had 
been in contact with selective programs had significantly lower social trust than the rest of the 
population. The negative effect on social trust caused by interactions with means-testing 
institutions remained statistically significant controlling for many other variables that are 
known to affect social trust (the level of education, social class, income, activity in voluntary 
associations, interest in politics, general happiness, political ideology, and employment). The 
Swedish data show that contacts with means-testing welfare state institutions seem to reduce 
interpersonal trust even when a large number of other factors are taken into consideration81 —
just as we reported for data from the United States. 
Universal programs and social trust 
 
Part of the answer to why countries with large and mostly universal welfare 
state programs have more social capital is that these programs create societies with less 
economic inequality. But the benefits may be more substantial than that.   First, universal 
programs are delivered with less bureaucratic hassle and control.  Second, universal programs 
may create a feeling of social cohesion in society. Patients, people in elderly care, pre-school 
and school-children, are not separated into different services based on if they are defined as 
“the poor” or not. These programs are supported by the poor, but also by the middle class and 
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highly educated professional strata.82  Periods when the Center and Right parties have been in 
power in Scandinavia (which they have been for a long periods, especially in Denmark and 
Norway) have not changed the universal character of these welfare states.83  The preferences 
for “economic leveling”—for a more equitable income distribution—are much stronger in the 
Scandinavian countries than elsewhere among the advanced industrial countries—and they 
are weakest in the United States and the United Kingdom, which have long histories of 
means-tested benefits.84  
Third, the existence of high quality universal programs, especially when it 
comes to areas such as education and health care, may increase a feeling of “optimism” and 
“equal opportunity” among large segments of the population. The Nordic countries are 
comparatively high spenders on social services and education.  Even college/university 
education is supported by taxes: The governments provide relatively generous student benefits 
and loans and there is no tuition. Controlling for most other background variables, survey data 
from a wide variety of nations, from Sweden to the United States to Romania, indicate that 
high levels of education results in high levels of generalized trust.85 Bjornksov shows a 
powerful cross-national relationship between the level of education in a country and its share 
of generalized trusters.86   
 Consistent with the emphasis on individual initiative in its political culture,87 the 
United States has lagged behind European countries in providing universal benefits.88  The 
great exceptions were the Social Security system and Medicare, the old-age pension and 
medical insurance for the elderly.  In the 1970s and 1980s, as trust was declining, the United 
States Congress passed legislation that shifted much of the “risk of investment (in retirement 
benefits for both programs) onto workers.  According to Hacker, the cuts in benefits spread 
“by far most rapidly among the lowest paid workers, who already had the lowest coverage 
levels.”89   
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 Even though Medicare is a universal policy without means testing, the quality of 
services to Medicare patients varies substantially across the American states.   Some states, 
especially those in New England, deliver high quality care to Medicare patients, as measured 
by the Washington Post in a series of articles in 2005.90  High quality care was determined by 
24 indicators from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Office of Clinical Standards for 
Quality and include the share of hospitals that give heart attack patients aspirin and beta 
blockers within 24 hours of admission as well as back and open-heart surgeries per 1,000 
patients.91   The worst performing states were in the American South.  More generally, the 
highest level of care occurred in the states with the lowest levels of economic inequality and 
the highest levels of trust.   Together, the levels of inequality and trust account for two thirds 
of the total variation in the quality of Medicare services across 44 states.   The most equal 
state ranks 34 (of 44) places ahead of the least equal state and a state with the highest level of 
generalized trust ranks 27 places ahead of the least trusting state.  Even though Medicare is a 
universal social policy in the United States, its administration is shaped by the underlying 
social forces in each state.  Where inequality is high and trust is low, there is insufficient 
social solidarity to provide high quality care to all citizens. 
 Here we see evidence of the inequality trap we posited above: As inequality has 
increased in the United States, growing pressures to do more for the poor have given way to 
budget cuts for programs designed to benefit those with the greatest needs.  Inequality 
produces lower levels of trust.  In 1960, 58% of Americans believed that “most people can be 
trusted,” while between 33% and 40% have held this view at the end of the 20th and the early 
21st centuries.  This declining level of trust translates into growing polarization and 
competition for government resources—and less support for programs that benefit the most 
needy.  The higher levels of equality and trust have sustained the welfare state in the 
Scandinavian countries.  Unequal societies are caught in a social trap of high inequality and 
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low trust, with trust levels too low to sustain the universal policies that would reduce 
inequality.  
The stickiness problem 
  Trust, inequality, and corruption are all sticky: Neither changes much over time.  
The r2 between generalized trust, as measured in the 1981, 1990-1995 World Values Surveys 
across between 1980 and the 1990s is .81 for the 22 nations included in both waves (see 
Figure 2)—the r2 between generalized trust in 1990 and 1995 is also robust (.851, N = 28).   
Inequality similarly moves little over time.   The r2 for the most commonly used measures of 
economic inequality92 between 1980 and 1990 is not quite as strong as the connection with 
trust over time, but it is still substantial at .676 for a sample of 42 countries (see Figure 3).  A 
new inequality data base developed by James Galbraith extends measures of inequality further 
back in time and across more countries.93   The r2 between economic inequality in 1963 and 
economic inequality in 1996 is .706 (for 37 countries, see Figure 4).  Inequality persists over 
time—it does not move easily. Moreover, this persistence of inequality leads to lower levels 
of trust and an unwillingness to adopt the policies that might alleviate inequality. 
[Figures  2, 3, 4 and 5 about here] 
  We see a similar dynamic for corruption:  The r2 between the 2004 
Transparency International estimates of corruption and those of the ICRG (International 
Country Risk Guide) in 1980-85 across 52 countries is .742.   And the r2 between trust and 
corruption in 2004 is .440 for 84 countries.  Trust, inequality, and corruption are all sticky—
and they seem to form a common syndrome. 
 There seem to be multiple equilibria: In the virtuous cycle, some countries have 
low inequality, high trust, honest governments, and universal social welfare policies.  These 
countries are continually “blessed” as they begin with a more level playing field and have the 
social fabric, the well functioning institutions, and the policies that will keep inequality in 
 27 
check.  In the vicious cycle, countries seem mired in high (or increasing) inequality, low trust, 
corrupt governments, and demands for more radical redistribution—a policy that will only 
increase social strains further and that will not yield the goal of reducing economic inequality.  
When inequality is very low (the 27 cases where the Gini index is .35 or lower), the r2  
between inequality and trust is miniscule (.013); we see the same phenomenon when 
inequality is high (greater than .42): the r2 is just .013 (N = 23).   In the middle, there is also 
not much movement (r2 = .051, N = 14).   This is the essence of the inequality trap: It is not 
easy to make a Brazil into a Sweden or a Finland.  Indeed, it is not so easy to make Brazil into 
a Portugal or a United States into a Sweden or even a Canada.   
   
The social trap of universalism, trust, and equality 
Perceptions of inequality lead the poor to demand redistribution and lead the 
rich to reject those demands.   We see this inequality trap very clearly in Central and Eastern 
Europe, where countries are making the transition from Communism to democracy although 
the story is likely to be much the same in other developing countries with high levels of 
poverty and inequality as well as low levels of trust. 
The growth of a market economy has meant displacement of many former state 
workers guaranteed employment and a living wage.  Communism already had depressed 
levels of generalized trust.  Overcoming both poverty and low levels of trust loomed large on 
the political agenda of these countries—but there has been little support for the universal 
policies that might create a more vibrant economy and society.  Instead, there seems to be 
support for a more radical redistribution of income that would exacerbate tensions and make 
the transition more difficult. 
Every country for which there are data on changes in economic inequality save 
one (Slovakia) showed an increase in economic inequality from 1989 to the mid-1990s.94  As 
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inequality rises, we see a clear link between perceptions of growing inequality and the belief 
that the only way to prosper is to be corrupt.. As an example, Mateju argues: 
...the long-lasting presence of an egalitarian socialist ideology and a 
functioning “nomenclatura system” associated with various social and 
economic privileges mean that those countries undergoing the post-
communist transformation will show a low tolerance for the growth of 
inequality...individuals who feel that lifechances for their group or class 
are declining in relation to those of other groups or classes may tend to 
consider such changers as the result of social injustice...95 
Attributions of success in life matter for two reasons.  First, generalized trust 
depends heavily upon optimism and control—the beliefs that life is good, is going to get 
better, and that you can help make it better.  When people fear for the future and see rising 
inequality, they are less likely to be optimistic.96  Believing that you need special connections 
or luck to succeed means that you do not believe that you are the master of your own fate.  
This pessimism about personal control over your own fate leads to lower levels of generalized 
trust in societies as diverse as the United States and Romania.97  
Transition societies are already low in trust.  As inequality increases, there are 
more demands for redistribution of wealth and confiscation of the fortunes of the newly rich.  
When Russian entrepreneur Mikhail Khodorkovsky confessed his sins of relying on 
“beeznissmeny” (stealing, lying, and sometimes killing) and promised to become 
scrupulously honest in early 2003, Russians regarded this pledge as “startling.” When he was 
arrested and charged with tax evasion and extortion under orders from President Vladimir 
Putin ten months later, the average Russian was unphased: About the same share of people 
approved of his arrest as disapproved of it.98 
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 The best policy response to growing inequality is to enact universalistic social 
welfare programs.  However, the social strains stemming from increased inequality make it 
almost impossible to enact such policies.  Demands for redistribution will thus lead to 
inefficient poverty reduction strategies—and ever more increasing social strains.  Starting 
from a base of relative equality, the transition states had a golden opportunity to enact 
universalistic social welfare policies.    Yet, these states also had corrupt governments with 
widespread tax evasion and little public confidence.  Transition states had only one of the key 
elements (relative equality) for the enactment of universalistic policies.  Lacking the other 
(honest government), they have been unable to stem the growing inequality and increased 
social strains that follow from it.   Many transition states had universalistic social welfare 
policies under Communist regimes, and most still do as official policy—but the 
implementation of such policies in transition has focused more on targeted benefits and health 
care often depends upon the ability to pay for insurance.99 Most transition countries have 
alternated right- and left-wing governments in search of economic stability.   Such political 
instability, veering from one pole to the other, reflects the lack of a social consensus on 
finding common ground.      
 
Conclusions 
If social trust is generated by the two types of equality that we have pointed at, 
and if universal policies are the best way to increase these types of equality, many countries 
with low levels of social trust and social capital may be stuck in social trap like situation.100 
The logic of such a situation is the following. Social trust will not increase because massive 
social inequality prevails, but the public policies that could remedy this situation can not be 
established precisely because there is a lack of trust. This lack of trust concerns both “other 
people” and the government institutions that are needed to implement universal policies. 
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Since social trust both is an important intrinsic value (personal happiness, optimism about the 
future) and has political value (support for fair institutions, minority rights, tolerance, etc.), 
and economic value (its positive relation to individual earnings and aggregate economic 
growth), it may be that dysfunctional governmental institutions are the worst social ill of all. 
Poor and inegalitarian countries thus find themselves entrapped into continuing 
inequality, mistrust and dysfunctional institutions.  High levels of inequality contribute to 
lower levels of trust, which lessen the political and societal support for the state to collect 
resources for launching and implementing universal welfare programs in an uncorrupted and 
non-discriminatory way.   Unequal societies find themselves trapped in a continuous cycle of 
inequality, low trust in others and in government, policies that do little to reduce the gap 
between the rich and the poor and create a sense of equal opportunity.  Demands for radical 
redistribution, as we see in many of the transition countries, exacerbate social tensions rather 
than relieving them.   
There will be no political support for universal programs since the rich benefit 
from high-level corruption and see the poor as “undeserving poor”.  The poor see almost all 
success in the market economy as evidence of dishonest behavior and believe that those who 
are well off already have taken more than enough from the state.  From this perspective, the 
idea that the better off should also have access to public services and benefits seems awkward. 
Moreover, even if you could generate enough political support to enact universal programs, 
people may not have enough confidence in government institutions to deliver them fairly and 
without corruption.  Persistent petty corruption may make “gift payments” appear to be 
rational responses to an unresponsive service sector: You may feel more secure in knowing 
that you can buy your children’s way into a good school and to good grades, rather than 
risking more neutral assignment and grading criteria.  You may well prefer to make an extra 
payment at a doctor’s office rather than wait your turn.   Corruption feeds upon economic 
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inequality, low trust, and poor government performance.  But it generates alternative ways of 
coping that may inhibit the adoption of programs that might alleviate inequality. 
Our message is admittedly a pessimistic one. Given the stickiness over time of 
both inequality and low levels of social trust, we think there is reason for our pessimism. Too 
much of the policy prescriptions that have come out from the social capital agenda have been 
too optimistic. If people just got more active involved in voluntary associations, things would 
improve. There are three reasons why we think this approach is wrong. First, the evidence that 
generalized trust is created by joining associations is simply not there. Secondly, it relieves 
governments from their responsibilities for dysfunctional public institutions and unfair or 
ineffective public policies. Thirdly, governments and the political elite can use this demand 
for increased participation in civic groups for blaming the victims in society.101 
Even though inequality is sticky, it can be moved.  Generalized trust may be a 
critical path to redistribution, but it is not the only one.  So we temper our pessimism just a 
bit.   The East Asian “tigers” achieved dramatic economic growth and reduced economic 
inequality through a series of policy choices that included high levels of spending on 
education, land reform, increased agricultural productivity, making health care more widely 
available to everyone, and opening up markets.102 Each of these policies made services to the 
public more widely available, as universal programs do.   Economic growth and lower rates of 
population expansion, in turn, lead to less inequality.103    
 There is a dearth of data that would allow us to test whether a rise in economic 
equality leads to greater trust or whether a country might create greater trust by adopting 
universal social welfare policies in the absence of either relative economic equality or honest 
governments.  We worry that the boost in equality necessary to raise generalized trust by a 
significant amount may be greater than we have witnessed in recent decades.  We also worry 
that the stickiness of corruption may put honest government out of reach for countries that 
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rank low on equality and trust.  We don’t know how to rid ourselves of corruption through 
institutional fixes.104  We know more about how to reduce inequality—through universalistic 
social policies.   How to get there is more difficult and our prognosis is not optimistic.  It 
seems as if the old saying is true: “Once the system gets there, it stays there.”  
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TABLE 1 
 
Trust and Inequality Equations from Simultaneous Model of Trust, Inequality, and Corruption 
 
 
Trust equation 
 
Economic inequality (Gini index) 
 
-.461*** 
 
.195 
 
-2.36 
 
Civil war 
 
-.086**** 
 
.025 
 
-3.41 
 
Protestant share of population 1980 
 
.174*** 
 
.063 
 
2.79 
 
Former Communist nation 
 
-.091** 
 
.045 
 
-2.01 
 
Government effectiveness  
 
.028 
 
.024 
 
1.18 
 
Constant 
 
.479**** 
 
.077 
 
6.19 
 
 
Inequality equation 
 
Trust  
 
-.152 
 
.187 
 
-.81 
 
Corruption  
 
       -.028*** 
 
.009 
 
-3.23 
 
Former Communist nation 
 
-.166**** 
 
.025 
 
-6.59 
 
Protestant share of population 1980 
 
.123 
 
.052 
 
2.38 
 
Muslim percent of population 
 
-.001**** 
 
.000 
 
-3.77 
 
Constant 
 
.583**** 
 
.035 
 
16.77 
 
 
Equation  
 
                                 R2 
 
         S.E.E. 
 
         Mean 
 
    F Statistic 
 
Trust 
 
.664 
 
.081 
 
.296 
 
21.35 
 
Inequality (Gini) 
 
.534 
 
.072 
 
.360 
 
12.34 
 
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001 (all tests one tailed except for constants)    N = 63 
 
Trust includes several imputed values as discussed in Uslaner (2005).  The government effectivness 
variable is a factor score of six indicators of effectiveness derived from the Fel! Endast 
huvuddokument.cross-national surveys of business executives (the 2004 Executive 
Opinion Survey of the World Economic Forum) as also discussed in Uslaner (2005).  
The corruption measure is the 2004 score from Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (where high scores indicate less corruption). 
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Instrumental variables: Religious fractionalization (from Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, 
Kurlat, and Wacziarg, 2003); English legal tradition (from the Levine-Loyaza-Beck data set 
at http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/llbdata.htm ),  GNP per capita (State Failure 
Data), constraints on the executive branch of government (Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004); military in politics (at www.freetheworld.com ); terrorism risk 
(ICRG); bureaucratic quality (ICRG), parliamentary system and proportional representation 
(from the Data Base of Political Institutions at 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/wps2283.html.   
Fel! Endast huvuddokument.Table 2 
 
Probit Analysis for Trust, 1992 American National Election Study 
 
 
Fel! Endast 
huvuddokument.Independent 
Variable  
Coefficient Standard Error t Ratio Effect 
Receives means tested benefit -.273** .154 -1.77 -.090 
Standard living better in 20 years .090**** .018 4.96 .122 
Have no say in politics -.068*** .024 2.83 -.092 
In-group trust -.006*** .002 -3.04 -.168 
Worry less about inequality -.038** .025 -1.54 -.051 
Talk to neighbors .239**** .083 2.88  .080 
African-American -.606**** .117 -5.17 -.199 
High school education .056**** .014 4.13 .202 
College education .064**** .010 6.03 .369 
Own home .168** .078** 2.17 .057 
Child should be curious .085**** .019 4.35 .117 
Child should be considerate .077**** .020 3.89 .106 
Age .009*** .002 4.13 .163 
Constant -1.048*** .257 -4.08  
 
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001  
 
-2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 2063.578    Estimated R2 = .299  N = 1753 
Percent Predicted Correctly: Probit Model 70.0   Null Model: 54.5 
 
 
Effect is the difference in estimated probabilities from the minimum to the maximum  
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values of the independent variable (except for age, where we use the range 18-75).   
For a description of the data and variables, see Uslaner (2002, ch. 4). 
